wages and benefits, and are barred from access to the judicial and other remedies for labor law abuses. These industrial and service "internships" are largely devoid of educational, technical or vocational content and often unrelated to the vocational aspirations of the students. 2 Employers and business-friendly local authorities in China have adopted a self-interested interpretation of the labor laws and regulations that places interns outside the protections of the labor law and bars them from taking their disputes to the labor tribunals. Understandably, these workers believe that they are being unfairly treated and have protested through strikes and other direct industrial actions.
Industrial interns are but the latest class of "cheap" labor to be deployed in Chinese industry. As early as 1979, in the wake of the economic and social devastation wrought by Mao Zedong's 3 Cultural Revolution, China's new leader, Deng Xiaoping, began to put forward an economic growth strategy based on cheap labor for foreign investors and cheaper goods for export. 4 As a result of this approach to development, China has experienced phenomenal industrial growth as well as massive internal migration from the country to the huge new cities that have sprung up on China's coast and in the South. 5 The Chinese government and the ruling Chinese Communist Party ("CCP" or the "Party") acknowledge that this furious industrialization and growth has also led to yawning social inequality, and has spawned widespread industrial unrest. 6 Chinese labor laws from the more socialist
The reform laws 14 reflect the Chinese Party-State's 15 awareness that achieving fair treatment, wages, hours, working conditions, and providing skills training are critical to China's ascent up the economic value chain along a path of labor and social peace. 16 The labor legislative framework stands alongside China's vast network of higher education institutions established in 1982; this includes universities and vocational schools aimed at enhancing employment skills among young workers entering the job market. 17 However, China-based export manufacturers and service providers have diverted young students from these institutions to unskilled labor at substandard wages and benefits without discernable technical or vocational benefits. Famous enterprises such as the Taiwanese company Foxconn, which manufactures and assembles most of the world's computers and mobile phones in its Chinese plants, have come to rely on large numbers of interns to staff their facilities. 18 Interns are often compelled to undertake this substandard employment in order to obtain the certifications needed to compete in China's job market after graduation. . 15 Given the leading role of the Party in state legislation and governance, China is often referred to as being governed by the Party-State. See generally RICHARD MCGREGOR, THE PARTY, THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA'S RULERS (2011) (using the phrase to sum up the control of all state organs by the Party and the fusion of the Party with the State). 16 The Shifting Geography of Global Value Chains: The Implications for Developing Countries and Trade Policy, supra note 12, at 14:
The Chinese leadership is acutely conscious of these issues, challenges and pressures. These are reflected in the 12th Five Year Plan (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . A key goal is to achieve greater social harmony and inclusiveness, reflecting dramatically rising inequality in China. The plan also emphasizes the goal of shifting the economy from investment-export driven to domestic-consumption driven. To bring China more into high-tech/high-value production, great efforts will be extended in education and research as well as by selecting emerging strategic industries. The vision is for China to become a high-tech economy in an environmentally clean and harmonious society. 17 See infra Part III(C). 18 See infra Part II (detailing the scale of Foxconn's exploitation of industrial interns in its manufacturing processes).
This form of exploitation corrupts the supply chains of global companies such as Honda, Toyota, Apple, and Chinese companies. 19 The fact that a large numbers of interns perform work identical to that of regular factory workers for subminimum wages has fueled dissatisfaction and work stoppages all over China. 20 Industrial interns at Honda and Toyota sparked widespread strikes during the summer of 2010, bringing newfound attention to the problems they face. 21 Despite these adverse consequences to economic development, Chinese and foreign employers have thus far successfully exploited intern labor by propagating the notion that interns working at unskilled factory work are not protected by Chinese labor laws when they perform work alongside and identical to that of formal employees-even when such work does not contribute to the acquisition of vocational, technical professional skills. Chinese labor and educational authorities at the local level appear to have ignored the scale and disruptive impact on industry of this form of "second tier" labor. 22 Arbitrarily leaving a significant segment of industrial and service workers out of China's emerging framework for preventing and resolving labor disputes by legal processes serves only to thwart China's recent, 19 See infra Part II (describing the processes through which multi-national corporations have contracted with vocational schools to exploit students as form of industrial interns for cheap labor). 20 22 See Mass Production of Labour, supra note 20, at 5 (noting that courts do not hear labor cases from interns, claiming that the interns lack labor relationships); Liang Shumei, Cheap Labour in Essence, Students in Name: Vocational School Interns in China, ASIAN MONITOR RESOURCE CENTRE, Sept. 14, 2011, http://www.amrc.org.hk/print/1179 (noting that, because student workers are believed to be unprotected by labor laws, the Labour Inspection Bureau will not address complaints by interns); A Political Economic Analysis of the Strike in Honda and the Auto Parts Industry in China, IHLO, July 2010, at 13, available at http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/W/000710.pdf (observing that the All-China Federation of Trade Unions ("ACFTU") does not have a position that protects intern labor). laudable efforts to fashion a workable labor law for a market economy. 23 Yet that is exactly what many Chinese employers and their allies in government are doing-classifying students recruited from technical and vocational schools as "interns" (and therefore outside the coverage and protections afforded to ordinary workers under Chinese labor law) and requiring these "interns" to perform ordinary labor without the educational, technical, or vocational benefits inherent to an internship. The results of excluding these intern laborers from the protections of the newer labor law standards regarding wages, hours and working conditions, as well as from access to labor law remedies, are plain: wide-spread, intern sparked strikes that marred China's path to development.
See generally The Mass Production of Labour: The Exploitation of Students in
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In an analogous (but hardly identical) context, the United States Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter cautioned against reading reform legislation designed to cure defects in the labor law with "a spirit of mutilating narrowness," lest the overriding policy of peaceful industrial dispute resolution and uninterrupted production be undermined. 25 The "mutilating narrowness" underlying the misclassification of these intern workers slights the supremacy of China's own legislative and administrative processes for setting policy-here the crucial industrial and social policy of social harmony. This paper argues that industrial interns laboring in the private sector should be covered under Chinese labor law when they perform unskilled work unrelated to their educational, technical or vocational aims.
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Some interns working in bona fide technical or vocational programs may indeed not be fully covered by labor laws. Such genuine and beneficial educational programs have no need for the full weight of labor law. However, many Chinese students are compelled to work long hours for substandard pay in industrial internships, devoid of any technical and vocational benefit to students, at companies like Foxconn. Under these circumstances, these nominal students cease to be interns and should, 23 See 2008 Labor Contracts Law, supra note 14, art. 1 (stating that the purpose of the law is "to improve the labor contract system, specify the rights and obligations of both parties to the labor contracts, protect the legitimate rights and interests of the workers and construct and develop a harmonious and steady employment relationship"). 24 See infra Part II (describing how the brutal conditions under which industrial interns work has provoked collective action). 25 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 235 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.). 26 See infra Part III. We use the term "industry" or "industrial" to cover mainly unskilled factory work, or unskilled work in mines, mills, transportation and other facilities, including infrastructure, where goods are produced and transported to market. By "service" we mean service sector. We also use the terms "industry and industrial" to sweep in unskilled work in factories, mines, mills, transport and service. instead, be treated as "workers" under Chinese labor law and afforded the full legal rights that are provided to their full-time counterparts.
In many cases, the current practice of compelling industrial interns to work at substandard wages as a condition of being certified to compete for jobs not only violates Chinese labor laws, but also amounts to forced labor under international law. 27 This paper also identifies the international and comparative approaches to the labor law status of industrial interns to provide comparative law context for addressing the looming problem of intern labor in China. 28 Part II of this article discusses the historical development of industrial internships and the current exploitation of such students working under substandard conditions alongside full-time employees. Part III examines contemporary Chinese labor laws to conclude that a reasonable reading of the legal framework covers industrial interns performing work equivalent to that of their full-time counterparts, without any educational benefit in their chosen fields of specialization. Part IV identifies how such exploitation of industrial interns constitutes forced labor under international law. Part V criticizes the enforcement of China's labor law framework as deficient in light of comparable legal frameworks.
II. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF CHINESE VOCATIONAL INTERNSHIPS
The Maoist Cultural Revolution emptied the institutions of higher education, dispersing faculty and students often for work in agriculture. 29 Following this decimation of the China's educational infrastructure, the Central Government began aggressively promoting vocational education in 1980 to create a workforce for private industry and services. 30 It paired this promotion with the liberalization of its economy. 31 The government's accelerated cooperation between vocational schools and enterprises 32 was one method to promote the transition of the workforce from agriculture to 27 See infra Part IV. 28 See infra Part V. 29 The Cultural Revolution (1966-76) was a "cataclysmic" attack launched by Mao on most Chinese institutions, including the Communist Party, schools and universities. Institutions of higher education emptied as students were sent to the fields to work as peasants in a campaign to reeducate students. See generally HUTCHINGS, supra note 4, at 90-96. 30 Shumei, supra note 22 (noting that the Cultural Revolution reduced the number of vocational schools from 60,000 in 1965 to 4,700 in 1978) . 31 Shumei, supra note 22. 32 Shumei, supra note 22 (describing the system of school-enterprise cooperation as "factory in front, school at the back").
industry. 33 As Chinese industry expanded rapidly on the coast and in the south, labor shortages at all levels of the vocational ladder emerged, even for unskilled labor in industry and the service sector. As enterprises recovered from the financial crisis of 2008 in response to Beijing's robust stimulus program, further industrial expansion meant more acute labor shortages for even unskilled labor. Vocational schools and provincial governments responded by placing interns primarily according to the needs of the enterprise, rather than according to the educational projects and history of the students.
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Vocational schools are now a significant source of industrial and service labor. In 2010, forty-two percent of the 18.1 million Chinese students completing their nine years of compulsory education opted to enroll in vocational school. 35 Out of China's 10,864 operating secondary vocational schools in 2010, the local and provincial governments managed 7,700 schools, the central government managed 41 schools, and 3,123 schools were privately operated. 36 Given the large number of vocational students in China, the categorical exclusion of student interns from the protections of Chinese labor law would have a substantial and immediate impact on industrial relations.
Students in vocational schools select a wide variety of majors, ranging from fields such as manufacturing, finance, tourism, and medicine. 37 However, when the students enter the workforce, their assignments too often turn out to be unrelated to their chosen field. For example, interns majoring in infrastructure construction are assigned to provide security checks in subway stations. 38 Foxconn interns assembling electronics feature diverse majors like nursing, languages, and art. 39 The disconnect between an intern's educational aspirations and their internship is hardly the result of the intern's choice. Interns are by fiat assigned to positions completely unrelated to their studies, and they have no choice; schools often claim that assignments are made under color of provincial authority and that the interns must accept the internship in order to receive 33 their diplomas. 40 Redress in these situations is limited: interns are unable to file complaints to the school about poor working conditions for fear that the school will retaliate by denying them their diplomas. 41 These interns become less competitive job applicants in their chosen fields due to a lack of progress in appropriate skill acquisition. Abruptly switching the education and training focus from the prior curriculum in the vocational schools to an unrelated internship also does not foster acquisition of those higher skills required to build the higher value added economy that is the stated goal of Chinese economic policy.
Recent attention brought to Foxconn's (China's largest non-state owned employer) extensive reliance on student intern labor demonstrates that these industrial internships are devoid of educational value. Foxconn runs what may be the largest internship program in the world, with vocational students directed by their schools and provincial governments to work for Foxconn or leave school. 42 While Foxconn claims that only fifteen percent of its workforce is intern labor, Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehavior (SACOM) estimate the percentage of interns being as high as thirty-three percent, or 430,000 of the company's 1.3 million factory laborers. 43 To help assemble such an enormous workforce, the company arranged in 2010 to receive 100,000 interns from Henan as well as interns from the student bodies of 119 schools in Chongqing. 44 At the end of 2011, Foxconn reportedly contracted with 100 vocational schools to provide intern labor for its growing production needs. 45 Interns work for a 40 Mass Production of Labour, supra note 20, at 3; see, e.g., Garside, supra note 39 (reporting that a vocational school in Henan ordered students, nine days before they were to leave for holiday, to work over the holiday or else drop out of school). 41 Mass Production of Labour, supra note 20, at 1. period of three to twelve months; according to worker rights advocates, they often work ten hours per day, sometimes as much as thirteen hours, between six and seven days per week. 46 A prominent Chinese scholar notes that Foxconn interns receive none of the benefits of formal workers and less compensation for identical work. 47 These interns are exposed to the same work environment as their full-time counterparts, including Foxconn's system of military discipline, which publicly humiliates workers for small infractions and permits corporal punishment. 48 The grueling and punitive working conditions at Foxconn have led to a disturbing rise in employee suicide. In 2010, the company reacted by installing nets outside worker dormitories to prevent suicides. 49 Indeed, the employee suicide issue had grown to the point where, according to labor rights advocates, workers were compelled to sign a most curious document pledging not to commit suicide. As a result of the public outcry against Foxconn's practices, Apple enlisted a labor consultant, the Fair Labor Association (FLA), and claimed that it had improved conditions for its workers. 51 In light of the continuing strikes and protests surrounding this employer, this claim remains subject to doubt. 52 Current reports continue to be unreliable and misleading.
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Foxconn admitted that, as recently as October 2013, over one thousand students labored in the production of gaming consoles, and a May 2013 report by Apple that claimed to find no intern labor at a Chengdu factory was also found to be false. 54 The persistent abuses at Foxconn recently provoked 2,000 workers to strike at a Taiyuan plant in September 2012, where 79,000 laborers worked; the protest injured about forty workers and required about 5,000 police officers to quell. 55 While Hewlett Packard has also announced new standards for its student labor, including reducing the percentage of student labor at its suppliers' s-Keynote_-_Pun_Ngai_-_Powerpoint.pdf. factories, the company faces continuing challenges in monitoring practices at individual factories. 56 Foxconn is emblematic of the harmful consequences of exploiting young interns in the huge electronics sector, given its vast size and ties to Apple. However, it is hardly the only electronics manufacturer that exploits intern labor. For example, labor rights activists charge that Wintek Corporation, which supplies products to Apple and Nokia, requires interns to work eleven hours per day, seven days a week. 57 HEG Electronics, which produces electronic components for Samsung, Motorola, and LG, is reported to use students for eighty percent of its workforce. 58 Those interns are paid only 750 yuan per month, while the average minimum wage in the province is 950 yuan per month. 59 HEG is further alleged to employ underage workers as young as fourteen years of age.
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Similar treatment of student interns exists in other industries. In one of the Honda factories that went on strike throughout China in 2010, eighty percent of the 1,800 workers were student interns. 61 Honda's interns performed identical work to that of regular workers. While the formal employees earned 1,544 yuan per month, the interns earned only 900 yuan per month without any social benefits such as accident protection.
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Immediately following the strike, interns' wages increased to 1,500 yuan per month, but that increase was still far less than the increase received by full-time workers who saw their wages increased to 2,044 yuan per 56 59 Id. In China, the minimum wage varies from one locality to the next. See, e.g., Guangdong Revises Minimum Wage Levels, CHINA BRIEFING, Mar. 6, 2013, http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/03/06/guangdong-revises-minimum-wagelevels.html (in 2013, minimum wages in some of Guangdong Provinces factory areas were increased to RMB 1130-1310 per month). 60 See Robertson, supra note 58. 61 CHRISTOPH SCHERRER (ED.), CHINA'S LABOR QUESTION 136-37 (2011) (referring to a strike at a Honda factory in Foshan city in Guangdong province). month. 63 In the garment and textile industry, interns are the most common source of temporary labor and receive less remuneration than full-time workers performing the same tasks. 64 Not only are industrial interns' wages less than those of their full-time counterparts, but they are also further reduced by their vocational schools, which extract steep tuition payments even while the interns are performing their internships outside of the classroom.
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Of the nine million students graduating from Chinese vocational schools each year, the exact number of interns forced into non-educational internships is unknown. However, given media reports of extensive forced internship programs, as well as the hundreds of schools that contract with individual enterprises, this practice of relying on subminimum intern labor is emerging as a major cause of industrial discord. 66 The refusal to expand labor protections to interns allows enterprises to exploit interns as a malleable pool of unskilled second tier cheap labor. 67 Enterprises benefit from intern labor not only because it is cheaper than hiring full-time employees, but also because it advances a model of lean production: by creating a tier of comparatively secure regular long term laborers over a lower tier of industrial interns, companies can exploit the differences when workers engage in collective action such as strikes. 68 Adult workers feel content with their compensation because it is higher than that of interns doing the same work, and the interns are less inclined to align with the adults in a labor dispute because they resent the better pay of the adult laborers. 69 Thus, the two factions that might unite to improve working conditions are set at odds with one another. 63 Id. at 138. 64 Id. at 122. 65 See generally Mass Production of Labour, supra note 20, at 4 (noting that schools often deduct commissions from interns' income or receive compensation directly from the enterprise for supplying the labor, even though the Ministry of Education recommends against such labor). See also Chan, supra note 46 (describing how a school in Guiyang confiscated student wages as tuition fees). 66 See Mass Production of Labour, supra note 20, at 4 (synthesizing forty-two media reports involving sixty-two schools and factories). 67 Shumei, supra note 22.
68 SCHERRER, supra note 61, at 137. 69 SCHERRER, supra note 61, at 137 (explaining the difficulties that prevent the two groups from uniting in industrial disputes, but noting that such difficulties were overcome during a Honda strike).
III. READING CHINESE LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEXT OF RAPID INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: CHINESE LAW PROTECTS INDUSTRIAL WORKERS EVEN IF THEY ARE MISCLASSIFIED AS "INTERNS."
A. Contemporary Chinese labor law developed to emphasize the broad inclusion of workers into legal coverage and access to remedial processes.
Reading Chinese law is not always easy. Chinese legal and regulatory frameworks are frequently criticized for incoherence, sometimes amounting to subversion of the rule of law. "At first glance, aspects of this system appear aberrational or even dysfunctional." 70 Too often:
Chinese legislation is perpetually in half focus as it fades into its background context of Party decisions and policy documents … The continued reliance of Chinese decision makers on policy directives and makeshift regulations to introduce reforms clearly compromises any movement towards a legislative model in which formal sources of law provide a coherent foundation for interpretation … elaboration. 
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The proliferation of strikes and protests over industrial grievances has imparted urgency to the project of fashioning an effective private sector labor law for China.
China's journey to a socialist market economy 73 was wrenching.
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In the planned economy era (1949-77), many industrial workers held "iron rice bowl" jobs in state owned enterprises; the "iron" referred to the high level of job security in this labor relations system. 75 A rigid registration system also kept the population in place. Thus, mobility was severely restricted. 76 To allow for the growth of a new private industrial sector, China loosened restrictions on job and residency mobility and further allowed the new private industrial employers, and even state owned enterprises, to hire and fire more freely and thus absorb migrant workers.
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In the late seventies, China began to promote rural-urban migration to absorb excess rural population.
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In the nineties, China laid off hundreds of thousands of state enterprise workers. At the same time, millions of migrant workers from the countryside began to work in unregulated private sector industries, often in abusive conditions. 79 The inevitable result was increased labor and social protests. In the early nineties, China began to formulate a comprehensive law of national scope to allow for increased employer discretion in hiring and firing, and at the same time to address social unrest arising from job insecurity and employer abuses.
In 1994, China enacted a far reaching national labor law that became effective in 1995, affording employers, including state owned enterprises, the ability to more freely terminate the implicitly secure socialist, "iron rice bowl" employment relationship. 80 The employment relationship, under that law, was based on individual contract and not status. To balance the loss of job security implicit in this system of individual employment contracts, and enhanced employer power to hire and fire, the drafters established basic standards regarding minimum wages, maximum hours of work, decent housing conditions, and protections for women workers to prevent employer abuses and the by heavy industry workers coping with mass lay-offs and the struggles of new entrants into the job market during this transitional period). 75 Iron rice bowl, or "铁饭碗" in simplified Chinese, is a term used in China to refer to the system during China's planned economy period that provided employees guaranteed lifetime employment , as well as benefits delivered through one's work unit (单位), including pension, housing and medical care. The system was gradually abolished in the process of China's transition to a market economy. 76 80 See supra note 9.
industrial unrest caused by violations of labor rights. 81 Therefore, the 1995 Labor Law set out basic worker protections such as the eight hour work day, overtime restrictions, prohibitions against discrimination and maternity and social insurance benefits.
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Despite its intent to address abuses and labor unrest, the 1995 Labor Law did not work. As two scholars of Chinese labor relations, Mary Gallagher and Dong Bao Hua, note:
[G]iven the large expansion of the migrant and informal workforces in the 1990s, large swaths of the Chinese workforce found the law almost completely irrelevant to their working lives. Even though the law should cover them, enterprises ignored the law with impunity because of the lack of effective implementation and enforcement by local regulatory or supervisory organizations, including the trade union, the local labor bureau and the courts. 83 The scale of persistent labor abuses can be gleaned from a report by the state-and party-controlled union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), that, in 2003, a total of USD $ 6.1 billion dollars were in arrears. 84 Eli Friedman and Ching Kwan Lee estimate that this figure is "but a small portion of the total sum." 85 81 1995 Labor Law, art. 1 (describing the intent of the law as to "protect the legitimate rights and interests of laborers, readjust labor relationship, establish and safeguard the labor system suiting the socialist market economy, and promote economic development and social progress."); COONEY ET AL., supra note 76, at 50-52. 82 84 Friedman and Lee, supra note 83, at 513-14. 85 Friedman and Lee, supra note 83, at 513-14.
In light of widespread labor abuse and worker unrest, the government sought to address the "evils" 86 unresolved by the 1995 Labor Law. In order to more precisely frame those abuses and to target remedies, it actively reached out to all sides of the industrial debate; employers, the official union, scholars, labor rights advocates and thousands of individual workers weighed in on detailed proposals to remedy the problems sparking industrial unrest. A consensus developed that the key to achieving uninterrupted production was to lay out basic labor standards, rigorously enforce those standards, and channel industrial disputes into peaceful dispute resolution processes. 88 These reform measures aimed at framing an encompassing structure of basic rights, and establishing dispute resolution processes for industry to settle grievances and to ensure peaceful and uninterrupted economic development in manufacturing and related sectors. 89 The centerpiece of the three labor reform laws, the Labor Contract Law, restated many of the worker's rights articulated in the 1995 labor law. 90 The Labor Contract Law, however, went further by focusing on wage arrears, illegal terminations, and other acute labor 86 See SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60:2 (West, Westlaw 2014) (the term "evil," as used in U.S. statutory interpretation law, describes the evils or precise problems a reform statute aims to rectify). 87 abuses by establishing more stringent enforcement remedies for labor violations. Judicial and alternative remedies were strengthened, and workers were empowered as the monetary remedies for employer abuses increased. 91 The companion law on labor dispute resolution, the 2008 Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, addressed the unrest bedeviling Chinese industry by channeling labor grievances into extensive legal mechanisms for dispute resolution-mediation, arbitration and the courts. 92 Finally, the Employee Promotion Law laid out more detailed prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, disability and status as a carrier of an infectious disease.
Significant exclusions of industrial workers from this basic framework of rights and access to legal processes for industrial dispute resolution would undermine the government's overriding industrial policy of ensuring labor and social harmony. 93 Excluding interns, who have assumed a large role in Chinese manufacturing and service sectors, leaves significant industrial actors with the capacity to disrupt production outside 91 China
The first national labor law statute enacted after 1982, the 1995 Labor Law, uses sweeping terms to define its reach:
This Law applies to all enterprises, individual economic organizations . . . and laborers who form a labor relationship therewith (企业、个体经济组织和与之形成 劳动关系的劳动者)
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The 1995 Labor Law further proclaims that "[l]aborers shall have the right to be employed on an equal basis," (平等就业) and therefore enjoy basic labor standards. 95 This statute contains no express exclusions for any category of workers. 96 The 1995 Labor Law also establishes a set of remedial mechanisms for labor disputes, recognizing that rights enforcement and prompt resolution of disputes are essential to industrial peace.
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Once such threshold questions of labor law coverage are resolved, then Article 2 requires only two factual predicates: (1) an employing entity, and (2) a subordinate worker in a labor relationship with the employing entity. Exclusions of significant groups of industrial workers in specific enterprises would be at odds with this scheme of comprehensive labor protection and industrial peace. Because of its relationship to the 1995 Labor Law, the stated intention of the National People's Congress ("NPC") in enacting the 2008 Contract Labor Law was a reformist one: "…to improve the employment contract system," eliminate abuses, prevent disruptions in production, and promote "harmonious and stable employment relations" by enforcing basic standards. 98 Rather than propounding a list of the specific categories of workers it covers, the 2008 Labor Contract Law emphasizes the empirical dimension of the work relationship as the key to its scope, which strongly argues for inclusion and not exclusion of industrial interns. When judges have been confronted with the question of whether a worker is a covered under the 1995 and 2008 Labor Laws, empiricism has dominated over invocation of labels. In order to determine whether a laborer is a covered worker as opposed to an uncovered independent contractor, judges first examine whether the employing entity is an individual, because both the 1995 Labor Law and the 2008 Labor Contracts Law describe the employing party in the labor relationship as an entity other than an individual. 100 Some judges under the 1995 law required proof of the existence of a labor contract as a prerequisite of an action when the worker is employed by a non-commercial organization, even though the 1995 law compels employers to issue labor contracts.
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The absence of such a contract would be a plain violation of that law. 98 101 See COONEY ET AL., supra note 76, at 53-54 (clarifying the general recognition that a labor relationship can exist without a formal contract under the contemporary legal framework).
Under this "mutilating[ly] narrow," 102 indeed perverse reading, an employer who violates the law by refusing to issue a contract to workers benefits greatly, as the worker then cannot seek judicial relief for the employer's violation.
Article 11 of the 2008 Labor Contract Law firmly forecloses this judicially created loophole by instructing judges to impose a labor contract by law where an employer has violated the law. Article 11 specifies the requirements for labor relationships where employers refuse to conclude contracts with their workers. 103 In order to ascertain that an employment or labor relationship exists, judges often look to empirical evidence such as the pay system involved, and the requirements of the Notice of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, which details factors that evidence the existence of a labor relationship.
104 Such an empirical approach should also apply to ascertaining whether a nominal intern is an employee because often interns are treated by the employer like industrial workers in terms of when they are paid.
Further, the 2008 Labor Contract Law, like the 1995 Labor Law, espouses the value of "equal treatment" of similarly situated workers in employment. 105 The statutory principle of "equal pay for equal work" is articulated in both the 1995 and 2008 laws.
106 Applying this principle, interns who work full and overtime as unskilled industry labor should receive compensation equal to the regular workers alongside whom they toil. The statutory principle of equal treatment is not consistent with a twotiered system of labor rights and compensation. 103 2008 Labor Contract Law, art. 11 ("In the event that an Employer fails to conclude a written employment contract with a worker at the time it starts to use him, and it is not clear what labor compensation was agreed upon with the worker, the labor compensation . . . shall be decided pursuant to the rate specified in the collective contract; where there is no collective contract . . . equal pay shall be given for equal work."). 104 See COONEY ET AL., supra note 76, at 54. See also infra part III(D)(ii) for a detailed discussion of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security's specific requirements for determining the existence of a "labor relationship" subject to regulation under Chinese law. The general Contract Law governs contractors such as independent service providers and consultants because they are outside the scope of private labor relations.
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Genuine independent contractors engage in relationships covered by Chapter 15 of the general civil Contract Law, where "the hiree completes certain work as required by the hirer and delivers the work product, and the hirer pays the remuneration." 110 This means that contractors, where the subordination present in the facts of the worker-employer relationship is largely absent, can appropriately be required to look to the civil contract law for rights and processes from remedying wrongs. Consequently, because industrial interns do not fall into any of these excluded categories, the protections of Chinese labor law apply if the specific factual circumstances indicate that the work performed in an internship is solely for the benefit of their employer and does not confer any educational benefit on the intern. Any other reading subverts the Party State's statutory policy of protecting workers and ensuring industrial harmony.
The use of the term "labor relationship" in the labor statutes, in the view of some commentators, opens the door to distinctions between protected and unprotected workers, between "real" workers and those that are merely empirically workers offering labor and being directed as to wages, hours and working conditions by employers.
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Yet these conceptions derive largely from academic and ideological concepts that have never been enshrined in contemporary Chinese labor law expressly or by necessary implication, and may have roots in Marxist 111 COONEY ET AL., supra note 76, at 55 (distinguishing between employment contracts and labor contracts, with only the latter being covered by labor law).
conceptions. 112 Instead of drawing untenable distinctions from a strained reading of Chinese labor law, the reasoned approach is simply to follow Chinese labor law and apply an empirical, totality of the circumstances approach to determine the existence of a labor relationship Labor law coverage means that disputes between a covered worker and the employer are remitted to legal dispute resolution procedures under both the 1995 Labor Law and the 2008 Labor Dispute Settlement law. A determination that a complainant is not covered would mean that the excluded person would have access only to the slower, interstitial, and costly litigation procedures of the civil law, versus the more expeditious, cheaper processes of labor mediation, conciliation and arbitration. 113 In the context of "just-in-time" production processes, this inevitably means that disputes would fester. 114 Finally, requiring student interns facing labor abuses to comb through statutes and regulations to institute an expensive civil action of uncertain outcome is, in fact, to condemn this class of workers to futile legal remedies. Students who toil on assembly lines in factories, like those in Foshan in the summer of 2010, will take to the streets rather than to the civil law courts or the murky administrative law processes that might be available in exceptional test cases. 115 The denial of legal remedies, while interns continue to be impressed as low wage foot soldiers in industry and service, augurs for further abuse of industrial interns and strikes.
C. Statutes providing for vocational and technical training render the educational component critical to an individual's legal status as an intern
Chinese labor law aspires to make training with real vocational content widely available to both students and employers. Article 5 of the 1995 Labor Law imposes a duty on the State to "develop vocational education."
116 Article 68 of the 1995 Labor Law establishes a parallel duty on employers to fund and provide vocational training. 117 In 1996, 112 COONEY ET AL., supra note 76, at 55. 113 Mass Production of Labour, supra note 20, at 5.
114 "Just-in-time" production is a "lean" manufacturing system whereby the employer does not stock large inventory, but produces and ships on tighter schedules. This is thought to reduce costs, by eliminating the need for large storage facilities and by tailoring production to existing and imminent orders. Strikes on such tight schedules can stop delivery of product to the customer. China passed a statute governing vocational education, and has since expounded upon that statute through administrative measures. 118 The 1996 Vocational Education Law seeks to expand vocational training throughout the provinces and localities of China and make skill enhancing training available to more students everywhere as part of a strategy of modernizing and rejuvenating China's economy. 119 The law obliges enterprises to "accept students and teachers from vocational schools and vocational training organizations to perform internships, and provide appropriate work compensation." 120 The 1996 Vocational Education Law does not write specific curriculum for job and skill training in the diverse and vast Chinese economy. The law does, however, establish that vocational and technical education should have educational content and benefits:
Vocational education is an important component of the educational undertakings of the State and an important way to promote economic and social development and employment. The State shall develop vocational education, propel vocational education reform, raise the quality of vocational education, establish and improve a system of vocational education that keeps abreast of the socialist market economy and social progress.
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Article 4 of the 1996 Vocational Education Law further states:
Vocational education shall follow the state's educational policy, giving the education receivers education on ideology, politics and vocational ethics; teaching vocational knowledge, developing vocational technical abilities, conducting vocational directions and raising the quality of the education receivers in an all-round way.
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Thus, the statute places development of the student's potential and aptitudes "in an all-round way" as one of the cardinal objectives of the law and on equal footing with economic development. Forcing students into vocational internships unrelated to their chosen fields of specialization completely disregards the 1996 Vocational Education Law's emphasis on the educational component of an internship and the Law's admonition to develop well-rounded students.
Moreover, the 2008 Employment Promotion Law illustrates that the needs of the student are of critical importance in designing a compliant vocational educational program. The 2008 Employment Promotion Law, the third of the 2008 labor reform laws, points to expanded vocational and technical training at the center of a policy of promoting higher skilled, higher paid employment. The law restates the governmental duty, at all levels, to expand vocational training and education. 123 Specifically, "governments at and above the county level" shall plan and implement vocational education programs that meet "economic and social developmental and market needs."
124 Accordingly, market forces alone do not dictate the specific contours of these programs. Instead, the law requires consideration be given to the market, the overall economy, and social developmental needs such as preparing young people for employment in their chosen areas of specialization when creating vocational education programs.
125
Chinese labor and vocational and technical education laws do not attempt to particularize content requirements for the training and educational components of internships. This sort of precision would be hard to achieve in a way that would be effective to define content for a very diverse and expanding economy in an era of astoundingly rapid change. Even the United Nation (UN)'s expert agencies in matters of vocational education-the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)-do not lay down specific content for all industries, settings, and times. However, some relevant markers of a bona fide vocational or technical training program do emerge from the literature.
The ILO's 1977 Convention 142, on human resource development, stipulates that vocational and technical education should "be designed to improve the ability of the individual to understand and, individually or collectively, to influence the working and social environment." 126 "portable competencies" and link to "life-long learning" so that skills and qualifications are instilled, which can accompany a worker over a lifetime of work in a technically advanced and diverse economy. 127 A joint recommendation from the ILO and UNESCO on vocational training reinforce the theme that vocational training, like all education, should be linked to the individual's interests, career choices and attributes. 128 In line with these recommendations by international doctrines concerning vocational education, the Chinese Ministry of Education is currently considering draft rules to govern work internships for vocational students (referred to as "Draft Rules"). 129 These Draft Rules, if issued, will require that work internships have substantial educational content and labor protections. This further supports the notion that the 1996 Vocational Education Law treats the educational component as a fundamental aspect of the internship. The type of unskilled labor internships in industrial and service sector enterprises that has become prevalent will not satisfy the stringent tests of educational content and relevance set forth in the Draft Rules.
130 This more rigorous approach to vocational education will end the practice of using the internship label as a shelter within which to construct a substandard workforce.
While workplace training is actively encouraged by government policy which anticipates that each student should spend one year on workplace straining, co-operation with employers is variable. Sometimes when it does occur it involves very close relations with a single local employer, with a risk that the skills acquired may not be transferable. There are few quality standards for workplace training and few regional, sectoral or national bodies to engage employers and link them to the VET system. Repeatedly, the Draft Rules emphasize that work internships must be related to the students' chosen fields of specialization, 131 match the students' major, 132 and contribute to the enhancement of the students' professional skills. 133 The Draft Rules would also require that interns enjoy labor protections and safe workplaces by requiring that such items be addressed in the mandatory internship agreement between the danwei, 134 the school, and the students.
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Requiring industrial and service sector internship programs to place students into internships that directly relate to the students' "majors" and contribute to the students' skills development and job qualifications would, without more, end the wholesale use of intern labor on factory floors and in other unskilled work situations throughout China. Enterprises like Foxconn and Honda could no longer use the label "student" or "intern" to create a subminimum tier of factory labor. Any suggestion that merely "training" factory workers in punctuality and obedience is somehow educational in any sense is makeweight; this suggestion cannot serve as a policy or legal basis for excluding intern factory workers from the protections afforded by Chinese labor law.
D. Neither the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress nor the Supreme Court have excluded interns who labor from labor law's protections.
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is the chief vessel for interpretation of the laws for the purpose of their implementation. 136 This feature of Chinese law emphasizes the legislative supremacy of national government, as well as its authority of the central government to review provincial and local law. 137 Standing Committee has refrained from interpreting these labor laws to remove any workers from coverage. Provinces and local governments more subject to pressures from local industries might impose laws that purport to exempt workers from labor protections due to their status as interns. However, such exemptions would be hard to square with the labor statutes, and the Standing Committee is responsible for annulling such regulations contradicting national legislation. 138 Crucially, the Chinese Supreme Court has recently rejected invitations to expressly exclude vocational school interns from labor protections. In 2010, the Supreme People's Court drafted an interpretation of all labor laws to explicitly exclude vocational interns. 139 However, the final version of the 2010 Interpretation includes no such exclusion. 140 The 2010 Interpretation is an advisory, guidance document for local authorities and courts and does not reveal why the Court declined the invitation to announce a wholesale exclusion of interns from coverage under labor law. The rejection of this opportunity to exclude these misclassified workers is nonetheless crucial because it reveals that the exclusion of workers as interns faultily misreads the law for the benefit of certain employers.
E. Administrative interpretations of Chinese labor laws look to empirical facts when determining whether a worker has a "labor relationship," and do not favor the categorical exclusion of intern-laborers.
a. Administrative interpretations of Chinese labor law confirm that the law contains no exclusion of intern-laborers.
On August 11, 1995, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security interpreted the new 1995 Labor Law. 141 The seminal Opinion on the Implementation of the Labor Law echoes the broad language of the statutes: "[A]s long as workers and enterprises and private economic units located within China form labor relations, such as when workers have become members of the enterprise and provide paid labor, then the labor law applies." 142 This interpretation is in line with the purposes and text of the statute, and confirms the commonsense proposition that the labor law should have comprehensive coverage to advance peaceful labor relations, and be applied in an empirical, logical manner in light of this industrial policy.
The 1995 Opinion does indeed exclude students (在校生), but solely in the context of work performed during their spare or free time (业 余时间): "when students work in their spare time, it is not considered as employment, and they may not sign labor contracts（在校生利用业余时 间勤工助学，不视为就业，未建立劳动关系，可以不签订劳动合 同)."
143 The text of this Opinion references students carrying a substantial academic load with casual or part-time work outside their academic schedule to help with costs. It does not reach compulsory full-time industrial internships characterized by scant deference to the goals of educational or vocational enrichment. Furthermore, a student can also be a laborer in a labor relationship and go to school. Interpretations of this Opinion or the underlying law that would divide students and workers into mutually exclusive categories fails to account for the empirical evidence that many workers go to school, and many students perform full and overtime work equivalent to that of laborers who are covered under the 1995 Labor Law.
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All of the workers excluded by the Ministry's 1995 Opinion follow from the language of the statute and the facts of the employment relationships. The Opinion explicitly excludes government employees, individuals serving in the armed forces, domestic workers, and agricultural workers. 145 As shown above, the exclusions for employees of public 143 Opinion on the Implementation of the Labor Law, supra note 142, art. 12. 144 See Shumei, supra note 22 (noting that enterprises hire high proportions of cheap intern labor in order reduce the proportion of regular workers); see, e.g., SCHERRER, supra note 61, at 137 (explaining that, despite how interns performed the exact same work as formal workers at Honda, the formal workers earned 1544 yuan per month plus social benefits, while interns earned 900 yuan per month without the social protection). The 2008 statutes did not, as noted, repeal the 1995 law. The 1995 law and the 2008 reform laws should be interpreted in pari materia.
institutions and military personnel are, at bottom, statutory as they are expressly within the purview of other statutes. 146 Additionally, the exclusions of farm workers and domestic workers derive from the 1995 law's requirement that the employer must be an "enterprise or individual economic organization" (企业、个体经济组织) rather than an individual to be in a "labor relationship" (劳动关系).
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Most domestic workers in 1995 worked for individuals. Fitting these isolated workers with the vast number of dispersed individual employers did not fit neatly in the traditional model of industrial relations. China's contemporary support for the ILO's Domestic Workers Convention certainly calls into question the force of the 1995 domestic worker exclusion and argues for reliance on contemporary facts about work and not on antiquated categories. Whatever the current validity of the Opinion's exclusion of domestic workers, these exclusions in the Opinion derive from the language of the statute and the facts of the relevant employment relationships.
The empirical methodology underlying the exclusions is emphasized by the Opinion's treatment of rural laborers. 148 The Opinion states that the law excludes rural laborers except for employees at township and village enterprises, and farmers who engage in employment and business in cities. 149 The Opinion's distinction between farm workers engaged in business transactions and rural laborers engaged in rural agriculture demonstrates that labels are not dispositive and that an empirical methodology is employed by Chinese administrative agencies to determine the existence of a labor relationship covered by Chinese labor law.
The Opinion omits industrial interns from its roster of excluded persons and its empirical thrust argues that interns who work full-time on assembly lines and sleep in factory dorms are not, in fact, students in libraries and classrooms, but laborers in a labor relationship. Moreover, vocational school interns work in many sectors. The designation of a student as an "intern" inaccurately portrays the nature of the work performed by students in industrial internships with employers like Foxconn. The Opinion, with its focus on the nature of the work performed, cuts strongly against a categorical, non-empirical exclusion of interns who perform routine, unskilled work completely unrelated to their chosen fields of specialization. 146 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 147 See 1995 Labor Law, art. 2.
148 Opinion on the Implementation of the Labor Law, supra note 142, art. 4. b. Vocational interns performing work equal to that of formal laborers satisfy the Ministry's empirical test for whether a worker has a labor relationship.
In 2005, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (successor to the Labor and Social Security Ministry) published a Notice clarifying when a "labor relationship" (劳动关系) exists between an employer and employee (the "2005 Notice"). It states that, even in the absence of a labor contract, a labor relationship exists when: 1) both the employer and workers meet the requirements established by law and regulations for being a qualified subject; 2) all labor rules and regulations established by the employer apply to workers, workers are subject to labor management by the employer, and workers perform paid labor under the arrangement of the employer; 3) labor provided by the worker is a component of the employer's business. 150 Further, the 2005 Notice lists the following facts as evidence for the existence of a labor relationship where no labor contract exists: 1) pay stubs or records (roster of employee wage distribution), records of social insurance payments; 2) "work badge" and "service card" and other documents issued by the employer to the worker as identification; 3) registration forms, application forms and other documents for hiring filled out by the worker; 4) attendance records; 5) other workers' testimony. Because vocational internships are typically negotiated between the schools and the enterprises, students do not usually have labor contracts with their employers. However, the absence of a labor contract between the intern and the enterprise does not negate the existence of a labor relationship. The 2008 Labor Contract Law forecloses this possibility by requiring employers to conclude labor contracts where none exist and by imposing one by operation of law where the employer has not yet produced any contract. Interns are in "labor relationships" because they satisfy all the criteria of the labor statutes, the 1995 Opinion and the 2005 Notice, despite the fact that the students have no direct labor contract, but instead, commence their work under the umbrella of an agreement between government, their school, and the enterprise.
Intern workers laboring in manufacturing industry jobs unrelated to their majors satisfy the three criteria of the 2005 Notice for establishing the existence of a labor relationship. As a preliminary matter, industrial interns are working for employing entities and are, as such, "qualified subjects" of China's labor relations laws. Chinese law has no simple guidelines for registering workers as laborers or entities as employing units. Interns and the entities for which they labor satisfy the first requirement (that they are employers and workers who meet the requirements established by law and regulations for being a qualified subject), because industrial interns perform work identical to that of their full-time counterparts and are not, as discussed previously, excluded from labor law protections. Further, given requirements that the employer must be an entity and not an individual, enterprises like Honda and Foxconn, which employ vocational school interns, also satisfy the first requirement, as they are entities registered under Chinese law.
Industrial internships satisfy the second requirement of the 2005 Notice because student interns at companies like Foxconn and Honda must abide by the same workplace regulations as their full-time counterparts. Many employers of interns seek cheap labor because the interns work alongside full-time workers while imposing the same regulations on both groups. If interns perform work indistinguishable from that of full-time employees, enterprises have no incentive to impose two different systems of workplace regulations. For example, Foxconn has developed an elaborate disciplinary system that applies to all factory workers, and includes demerits that are issued to workers and are publicly posted. 152 Finally, the interns' labor in these particular internships is a component of the employer's business, thus satisfying the third requirement of the 2005 Notice. This is seen not only through the Administrative Measures for Internships at Secondary Vocational Schools, which encourages third year vocational students replace full-time workers, but also because student interns perform tasks identical to tasks performed by full-time employees. 153 If interns contribute to the factory's production, then they play a role in creating goods that drive the employer's business. As such, these so-called interns directly contribute to the profits gained by the employer, meeting that important requirement of the 2005 Notice.
In short, the 2005 Notice sought to promulgate a test to determine when a labor relationship exists that would qualify a worker for protection under contemporary labor laws. Industrial interns at companies like Foxconn and Honda are in "labor relationships" that satisfy the Notice because (1) both the industrial interns and their employers are qualified subjects of Chinese labor law; (2) industrial interns abide by the same workplace regulations as their full-time counterparts; and (3) the work of industrial interns in these types of internships is a component of their respective employers' businesses and directly contributes to employer profits. Accordingly, industrial interns and their employers, under these circumstances, are in a "labor relationship" and should be afforded the protections of Chinese labor law. The current exploitation of industrial interns by companies like Foxconn runs contrary not only to Chinese labor and educational laws, but also to international labor laws prohibiting forced labor. This section does not argue that all vocational internship programs in China qualify as per se forced labor under the standards of the ILO, which promotes a global baseline of labor protection. Rather, the violation of international law follows from the facts. When interns perform an internship unrelated to their vocational aspirations as a requirement for graduation and receive less than the minimum compensation required by law despite doing similar work as full-time workers, then such internships qualify as forced labor. Unfortunately, thousands of schools requiring internships of this sort exist throughout China.
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Even though China has not ratified the Forced Labor Convention or the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, both are among the core labor conventions followed by the majority of the international community. 155 More importantly, China has committed itself as an ILO member state to abide by the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The Declaration clarifies that the abolition of forced labor is a fundamental principle. 156 As a member of the ILO, China has an "obligation . . . to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution," the abolition of forced labor.
Convention "at the appropriate time."
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The ACFTU desires rapid ratification, while the Federation of Chinese Enterprises worries that the Convention defines forced labor too broadly. 159 To date, the Chinese government has not addressed whether the condition of vocational school interns qualifies as forced labor. The Forced Labor Convention defines forced labor as all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily," though the Convention excludes military service, normal civic obligations, community service from court convictions, work exacted during states of emergency, and minor communal services.
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The ILO's General Survey on the Eradication of Forced Labor extrapolates three criteria from this definition of forced labor: 1) work or service, 2) menace of any penalty, and 3) involuntariness.
161 Vocational school internship programs do not fall within any of the exceptions to the Convention on Forced Labor and, therefore, the Convention would apply. Further, the current treatment of industrial interns by certain vocational schools and by companies like Foxconn satisfies the three criteria for establishing a "forced labor" relationship under the Convention. 163 Therefore, "only by reference to the various elements involved in the general context of a particular scheme of training" can one determine whether the scheme is "unequivocally one of vocational training or on the contrary involves the exaction of work or service within the definition of 'forced or compulsory labor. '" 164 Vocational internship programs that send interns to large production facilities owned by companies like Foxconn, Honda, and Toyota do not qualify as vocational education, but instead, as "work or service" under the ILO Convention on Forced Labor. Chapter Three of the Administrative Measures for Internships at Secondary Vocational Schools advises that vocational internships should meet the objectives of a student's major. 165 One way the Ministry of Education protects this is by discouraging first-year interns from replacing full-time workers, though it states that third-year students should replace full-time workers.
166 This rule will be frequently violated if the demand for cheap labor is strong enough. 167 Interns at factories may be as young as sixteen years old, which is the age students typically begin vocational school. Students at this age do not have the theoretical or practical background for skilled internships because they have not yet taken classes relevant to the development of skills required for these positions. 168 By placing students to work without the prior practical and theoretical background that a vocational school education should provide, students enter the workforce with no advantages over uneducated workers. Thus, the work performed in these internships does not supplement an intern's education and cannot properly be characterized as vocational training.
Further, students are often assigned to positions regardless of their majors. While most vocational school interns acquire technical majors, labor rights activists assert that students often perform work totally extension to compulsory general education, does not constitute compulsory work or service within the meaning of Convention 29."). 163 See CEACR General Survey of 2007, supra note 158, para. 36 (noting that the difficulties in distinguishing vocational training from work stem from vocational training's requiring some degree of practical work). 164 See CEACR General Survey of 2007, supra note 158, para. 36. 165 irrelevant to their studies. 169 A study of sixteen schools found that students commonly complained that their internships were unrelated to their fields of study. 170 Foxconn interns working on the assembly line include majors as diverse as tourism, pharmacy, and music. 171 The work these students perform during their internships is therefore not an extension of their education. Rather, it can only be characterized as "work or service" as defined in the ILO Convention on Forced Labor and, therefore, satisfies the first element of the test for determining the existence of a forced labor relationship.
B. Vocational school internships operate under the menace of penalty by
withholding diplomas when interns refuse to engage in their work assignments and by denying students access to complaint mechanisms.
The CEACR defines "penalty" more broadly than simply penal sanctions by noting that the word can also include "a loss of rights or privileges."
172 To clarify the definition of forced labor, the General Survey describes ways that forced labor can be used in voluntary labor: a person who refuses to participate in voluntary labor may lose certain advantages in a workplace environment where good performance results in workers receiving additional privileges and advantages. 173 The "menace of penalty" element may therefore be understood to refer to any adverse employment action taken by an employer against an employee for failing to voluntarily comply with an employer's demands.
Vocational school interns engaged in internship programs suffer from losses of rights, privileges, and advantages for failing to participate in their work. Participation in their internships is a mandatory aspect of their vocational training, and schools withhold diplomas from students that refuse to participate in their internships. 174 For example, a school in Henan 169 6, 2011) . http://sacom.hk/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/2011-05-06_foxconn-and-applefail-to-fulfill-promises1.pdf (noting that Foxconn, which has agreements with schools throughout the country, frequently hires interns even though the work they perform is unrelated to their majors). 170 See Mass Production of Labour, supra note 20, at 3-5 (noting various examples of student complaints). 171 Garside, supra note 39.
See Foxconn and Apple Fail to Fulfill Promises: Predicaments of Workers After the Suicides, STUDENTS & SCHOLARS AGAINST CORPORATE MISBEHAVIOR, 18 (May
172 CEACR General Survey of 2007, supra note 158, at para. 37. 173 See CEACR General Survey of 2007, supra note 158, at para. 37 (stating that these benefits may include "promotion, transfer, access to new employment, the acquisition of certain consumer goods, [or] housing or participation in university programmes," among others). 174 Mass Production of Labour, supra note 20, at 1 (noting that schools are unsympathetic to the complaints of students); see, e. The CEACR also provides that external coercion sufficient to interfere with a worker's voluntariness may derive not only from the law, but also from the employer's practices. 181 Further, the CEACR emphasizes that workers have an inalienable right to freely leave their employment.
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Since students consent to receiving vocational school education, the framework of the non-educational internships, paired with the external coercion students face before accepting their assigned internships, indicate that such consent is not voluntary. As noted above, many schools and enterprises do not assign internships according to the students' fields of study. Provincial governments that encourage these programs play active roles facilitating agreements between schools and private sector enterprises. These agreements are often (quite naturally) more deferential to the needs of the enterprise and the province's economic development, than they are to the vocational needs of the far less powerful students. 183 Further, when the school in Henan ordered the internship assignment to 180 See CEACR General Survey of 2007, supra note 158, at para. 38 (observing that, because voluntary offers are impossible if they result from threats, the voluntariness criteria overlaps with the menace of penalty criteria). 181 See CEACR General Survey of 2007, supra note 158, at para. 39 (providing that an example of indirect coercion from an employer can include the induction of migrant workers by "deceit, false promises and retention of identity documents"). 182 See CEACR General Survey of 2007, supra note 158, at para. 40 (concluding that laws preventing the termination of indefinite employment risks turning contractual relationships into legal compulsion, and therefore are incompatible with the Forced Labor Convention). 183 See Mass Production of Labour, supra note 20, at 5 (describing how provincial governments urge vocational schools to cooperate with business by providing the example of the Henan government, which was crucial to arranging 100,000 to work for Foxconn); A Political Economic Analysis of the Strike in Honda and the Auto Parts Industry in China, IHLO, July 2010, at 14, available at http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/W/000710.pdf (explaining that governments in urban and rural provinces have arranged internship schemes to transfer students between the provinces in order to advance economic development while also ensuring that the enterprises employed as many workers as needed).
Foxconn immediately before the holiday, teachers informed the affected students that the internship was by orders of the provincial government.
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Not only does the reality of interns performing work unrelated to their fields of study reveal that their work cannot qualify as vocational training under the first criteria, but it also demonstrates that the workers are not voluntarily accepting their internships if their schools and the government require them to work in fields completely irrelevant to the kind of work for which they paid tuition to learn. For example, interns working at Foxconn attended vocational school with the intent to study a wide range of unrelated subjects like tourism, language, and journalism. 185 Despite the lack of educational benefits, teachers monitor student attendance at the factories, and students must choose between accepting the internship and dropping out of school.
186 Not only are students deceived into performing work unrelated to their major, as they had originally expected to engage in work relevant to their studies, but they are being denied the ILO's fundamental right to leave their employment arrangements.
V. LABOR PROTECTIONS FOR VOCATIONAL INTERNS IN CHINA ARE DEFICIENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND WEAK COMPARED TO THE STANDARDS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.
China's increasing role as a global economic power should require that the government consider how to best develop domestic policies in line with customary international law. This section merely notes that the government's legal protections of vocational interns are deficient compared to those of other developed countries. 187 Furthermore, China's ascent up the economic ladder means that its laws governing student internships should more closely resemble the internship laws of other more developed countries to ensure a fundamentally sound and productive workforce. As such, this section examines the legal protections provided to interns in the United States, 188 responded to increasing attempts to provide basic labor protections to interns. Further, all of these developed countries emphasize the formal recognition of interns and their educational needs. In sum, the situations under which Chinese interns suffer at plants run by companies like Foxconn and Toyota would be illegal under these developed countries' regulatory frameworks.
A. Protections of interns under international law.
The Preamble to the ILO Constitution sets forth standards for vocational students' well-being, providing that vocational education is a field it strives to improve. 191 After developing a series of recommendations explicitly regarding vocational training, both general and targeted to specific industries, 192 the ILO settled in 1975 on Convention Number 142 on Human Resources Development and Recommendation Number 150 on Human Resources Development, the latter superseding all previous recommendations regarding vocational training and guidance. 193 China has not ratified Convention Number 142. While Convention Number 142 requires member states to use vocational programs to aid development, they must also "encourage and enable all persons, on an equal basis . . . to develop and use their capabilities for work in their own best interests and in accordance with their own aspirations, account being taken of the needs of society." 194 This requires that member states "adapt and harmonise" their training programs "to meet the needs for vocational training throughout life of both young persons and adults in all sectors of the economy and branches of economic activity and at all levels of skill and responsibility." 195 Similarly, Recommendation Number 150 elaborates on the Convention by emphasizing that member states must balance the needs of national development with those of individual workers. 196 Part IV of the Recommendation focuses on vocational training, and it emphasizes that such training must be educational for the student workers in that the education provided in school should correspond to training given on the job, and that programs generally are related to real work situations. 197 Further, such workers must, over the course of their training, "receive adequate remuneration" and "be covered by the social security measures applicable to the regular workforce of the undertaking." 198 Thus, the ILO stresses the need to balance the well-being of intern workers with concerns regarding economic development. This stands in stark contrast to the current practices of Chinese schools and provincial governments in managing student internships. Schools and provisional governments have, to this point, focused solely on the needs of the market and completely disregarded student well-being and academic development. If schools and provincial governments were to consider the educational well-being of students, interns would receive assignments in their fields of vocational study, rather than assigned work at Foxconn or Honda. Interns would also be paid equivalently to full-time workers when they perform equivalent work and schools would provide greater concern for the safety and other interests of interns as they perform their factory or other industrial work. Given that ILO law also emphasizes the ability of individuals to choose their professions, such internships fail to abide by the Convention and the Recommendation when vocational interns are required to perform work completely unrelated to their desired fields of specialization in order to receive their degrees.
B. The United States
While recent attention in the United States has focused on the quality of internships, particularly in regards to compensation, study. 210 Further, extensive cooperation is organized between the schools, the Public Employment Security Offices, and the businesses to ensure that students receive proper vocational guidance. 211 In contrast, many of the vocational internships in China require the presence of teachers on the factory floor; however, the purpose of this practice is to ensure attendance and promote workplace discipline rather than to promote vocational guidance as Japan's Employment Security Law promotes.
D. The European Union
European member states have long protected individual interns and trainees, and the European Social Charter emphasizes that citizens have a right to vocational training. 213 The European Union is currently supplementing these with an explicit Charter regarding internships. 214 The Charter, which has four articles, is intended to improve working conditions for young people. 215 First, the Charter affirms that internships are fundamentally educational endeavors. 216 Second, interns should benefit from decent conditions of which they are made aware beforehand. 217 Third, internships should exist only within the formal educational process, but those that do not should provide interns with full benefits. 218 Fourth, stakeholders should adequately develop and monitor such programs. 219 All four of these principles, if adopted, would greatly improve the quality of internships in China by addressing the lack of relevant vocational education and poor working conditions that a substantial number of industrial interns are currently forced to endure. Additionally, requiring in fact a formal educational process as a component of vocational education would better serve Chinese vocational students by guaranteeing that internships would provide students with skills applicable to their intended professions. Finally, requiring the relevant stakeholders, 210 Employment Security Act, art. 27, para. 3.
211 Employment Security Act, art. 22-25. 212 See Open Letter to Tim Cook, supra note 45. 213 Council of Europe, European Social Charter (revised 1996), art. 10, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/163.htm (placing the burden of providing access to adequate training on the 47 member states of the Council). 214 European Youth Forum, European Quality Charter on Internships and Apprenticeships, available at http://qualityinternships.eu/ 215 Id. 216 Id. 217 Id. 218 Id. 219 
Id.
like private companies doing business in China and vocational school programs, to adequately develop and monitor vocational educational programs would greatly improve the quality of such internships by holding these stakeholders accountable to the appropriate governing authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under Chinese law, the National Peoples' Congress and its standing committee, constitute the highest legislative authority. 220 When these unique institutions for crafting Chinese social and industrial policy arrive at a defined structure for implementing basic labor standards and securing peaceful industrial development, the framework should be respected by employers and bureaucracies. The legislature's control over China's basic industrial policy and development is subverted when interested employers and allies advance the view that interns who simply work at subminimum wages are by definition not covered by Chinese labor laws. There is no policy support in any of these labor statutes for the exclusion of such a huge segment of the Chinese industrial and service sector work force. In fact, the overarching policy of China's 2008 labor law reforms, with its focus on broad coverage for workers and empirical methods for determining the existence of a labor relationships, counsels against such a categorical exclusion of student interns based solely on labels applied by employers with vested interests in reducing operating costs.
China's rapid growth carries the promise of economic opportunity to all of its citizens, but such opportunities remain illusory as long as enterprises exploit vocational internships for cheap labor. This practice not only lies to students, who began their education believing that they would develop skills in their desired field, but it also undermines the Chinese government, whose current labor laws strongly suggest that industrial interns, like the ones who work for Foxconn and other large Chinese manufacturers, are ordinary workers afforded the protections of Chinese labor laws when these interns are in labor relationships. China should comply with international law and actively enforce its own laws by ensuring that these interns receive the educational benefits they should reasonably expect from a vocational program. When these programs are devoid of any relevant educational component and maintained solely for the benefit of the employer's bottom line, these interns should be afforded the full protection of China's labor laws.
